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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GOVERNMENT POWER IN
COLLISION: A LOOK AT RUST V. SULLIVAN
THROUGH THE LENS OF POWER ANALYSIS
In Rust v. Sullivan' the Supreme Court upheld regulations forbidding
abortion counseling in clinics receiving family planning grants.2 The Rust
decision provoked controversy in part because it limited a doctor's ability
freely and fully to advise a patient and it limited a patient's ability to
obtain medical information. 3 The controversy over the Rust decision rests
on the tension between congressional spending power and individual con-
stitutional liberties. 4 In this arena government has dual roles. On the one
hand government must exercise power in order to govern as the represen-
tative of the collective political will. On the other hand government must
ensure that its exercise of power does not erode the individual citizen's
constitutional rights. Tension between government power and constitutional
liberties is constant and inevitable.
The Rust decision selects a particular balance between government power
and individual rights. However, neither the decision nor the preceding legal
discourse explains why the balance should be struck as it was, or as the
Rust opponents would have it. The analytical models used by either side in
the controversy, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the rational
basis test of spending power, fail in two ways.- First, they apply labels
1. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
2. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991).
3. See ABA Backs Law to End Ban On Clinics' Abortion Advice, WASH. PosT, Aug.
14, 1991, at A4 (reporting that American Bar Association unanimously voted to support
legislation ensuring that federally funded health clinics could provide full information on
medical options relating to pregnancy, including information on abortion); Walter Dellinger,
Gag Me with A Rule, NEw REPuBLiC Jan. 6 & 13, 1992, at 14 (criticizing Rust Court for
deferring to administrative interpretation that raised constitutional questions and that was
contrary to congressional intent); Bradley Miller, Big Nanny Is Watching You: Do the Right
Thing, the Court's Way, WAsH. PosT, June 2, 1991, at D1 (describing Rust decision as Court
attempt to dictate morality in contravention of individual rights); Nat Hentoff, A Muzzle on
Medicine, WAsH. PosT, June 1, 1991, at A23 (criticizing Rust decision as inconsistent with
traditional protection of doctor/patient speech). By votes of 73-24 in the Senate, 137 CoNo.
REc. S16124-25 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991), and 272-156 in the House, 137 CONG. Rnc. H9445
(daily ed. Nov. 6, 1991), Congress passed an appropriation bill prohibiting use of funds to
enforce the Title X regulations. President Bush vetoed the legislation on November 19, 1991
and the House failed to override. 171 CONG. REc. H10,491, H10,492 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
1991); see generally Carole I. Chervin, Note, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the
Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 401 (1989) (arguing that Title
X regulations are statutorily invalid, violate First Amendment speech rights of grantees, clinic
employees, and patients, and violate Fifth Amendment privacy right of patients to choose
abortions). Chervin's commentary predated the Supreme Court's decision in Rust.
4. In Rust the precise government power at issue was that of the executive, not of
Congress, and of the judiciary to review executive policy in constitutional areas.
5. See infra Part II.A (describing analytical failure of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and rational basis test).
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rather than analysis and therefore produce inconsistent and illogical results. 6
Second, and more fundamentally, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
and the rational basis test miss the issue by focusing on discrete, isolated
elements of government power and individual rights rather than on the
dynamics of the relationship between the two. 7 Government power and
citizen autonomy are interdependent and reciprocal; as one changes, so
must. the other.
This Note suggests a different analytical framework that focuses on the
dynamics of the relationship between government power and individual
rights and the central role of expression in that relationship. The suggested
framework is power analysis, developed in the disciplines of political science
and sociology to study the nature and strength of power relationships in
social settings ranging in scale from the intimate to the national.8 Power
analysis reaches behind the label of doctrine to assess real power and
autonomy. Part I of this Note chronicles the Rust legal controversy. Part
II examines the analytical failures of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
and the rational basis test of spending power, and offers power analysis as
an alternative. The power analysis framework permits genuine analysis and
recognizes the critical role of freedom of expression and information in the
distribution of power. Part III uses power analysis to describe the effect of
the Rust decision on the balance between government power and individual
rights inside a clinic receiving federal family planning grants. Part IV applies
power analysis to other examples of government intervention, contrasting
those power landscapes and legal outcomes to Rust. Part V concludes that
Rust goes further than the comparison cases to enhance government power
at the cost of individual rights, and offers an observation and a suggestion.
The observation is that Rust is not an aberration, but a trend. The suggestion
is that power analysis is an appropriate way to monitor the balance between
government power and individual liberties, particularly when legal discourse
becomes polarized and conclusory.
I. THm Rust Decision
The Rust dispute involved a complex interplay of congressional spending
power, the implementation powers of the executive, and the interpretive
powers of the judiciary. The precise government power at issue was that of
the executive. An executive agency issued regulations construing a federal
statute in a way that raised constitutional questions.9 In 1988 the Secretary
6. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (describing illogical results produced by
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and rational basis test).
7. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (describing government power and individual
liberty as interdependent and mutually-affecting).
8. See generally SrEVEN Luicas, PowER: A RAicAL Vmw (1974) (drawing on major
mid-twentieth century works in power theory to develop new framework for power analysis).
9. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771 (1991). Ordinarily the Court defers to an
agency interpretation of a statute that Congress has authorized it to administer, so long as
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of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued new regulations governing
Title X family planning grants.'0 Congress had enacted Title X as part of
the Public Health Services Act of 1970 (Act)" in order to give grants to
family planning projects offering a broad range of services.' 2 Section 1008
of the Act provided that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this
subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning."' 3 From enactment of the Act until 1988, Congress and HHS had
interpreted the Act to allow grant recipients to offer neutral counseling
about abortion as long as the counseling did not have the immediate effect
of promoting abortion.1
4
the interpretation is a permissive construction of the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). However, when an agency
interpretation raises serious constitutional questions in the absence of clear congressional intent
to do so, the Court has rejected the interpretation. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see Rust, 111 S. Ct.
at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that HHS regulations raise serious constitutional
questions sufficient to require invalidation); id. at 1788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same). In
Rust the majority recognized that the regulations raised constitutional questions but reasoned
that the questions were not of sufficient magnitude to exempt the regulations from Court
deference. Rust 111 S. Ct. at 1771. Therefore, one result of Rust is that the executive has
some latitude to regulate and spend in ways that Congress did not expressly authorize but that
nevertheless raise constitutional questions. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HAv. L. Rav. 43, 51-59 (1989) (arguing that Rehnquist Court's propensity
to defer to political branches arises from lack of theory of constitutional interpretation); Gary
C. Leedes, The Discourse Alternative to Rust v. Sullivan, 26 U. RicH. L. Rnv. 87, 128-31
(1991) (criticizing deference of Rust Court to regulations that raised constitutional questions
and that shifted additional decision making authority to executive bureaucracy, and away from
citizen-sensitive democratic processes); Thomas W. Merril, Note, Judicial Deference to Exec-
utive Precedent, 101 YALE L. J. 969, 989, 989 n.87 (1992) (describing majority opinion in
Rust as "less than illuminating" on why Rust issues did not raise serious constitutional
questions, and as indicating that DeBartolo might be confined to its facts).
10. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922-2946 (Feb. 2, 1988), codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 59.7-59.10
(1991). Title X projects serve about 14.5 million women, of whom about 90% have incomes
below 15001o of the poverty line. 131 CONG. Rac. S16,860 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1985).
11. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-
300a (1988).
12. Id. § 300a.
13. Id. § 300a-6.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1985) (endorsing current regulatory
policy as effectively implementing Public Health Services Act of 1970 (Act) prohibition on
funding for abortions and stating that further regulatory restrictions would be beyond con-
gressional intent and without statutory foundation); H.R. REP. No. 403, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
6 (1985) (approving Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations providing
for nondirective abortion counseling); New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1269-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd sub nom. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd
sub nom. Rust V. Sullivan, II S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (citing HHS memoranda and letters during
1970s approving nondirective abortion counseling by grant recipients); UNITED STATES DE-
PARnThErr oF H ALTH AND HUMAN SEnvicas, PROGRAM GuIDELINEs FoR PROJECT GRANTs FOR
FAmILy PLANuia SERvICEs 13 (1981) [hereinafter Program Guidelines]. The Program Guidelines
provide:
Pregnant women should be offered information and counseling regarding their
19921 1025
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The 1988 regulations made four fundamental changes. First, they changed
the definition of "Title X project funds" to include clinic matching funds
and income as well as federal funds,'" and they changed the definition of
"family planning" to exclude pregnancy care and postconception services.'
6
Because the regulations applied to the use of "Title X project funds," they
applied to private as well as federal funds. Second, the regulations prohibited
projects receiving Title X grants from providing any counseling on abortion
as a method of family planning, and they required grant recipients to refer
pregnant patients to other providers of medical and social services who were
either neutral regarding abortion or prochildbirth.' 7 Third, the regulations
pregnancies. Those requesting information on options for the management of an
unintended pregnancy are to be given non-directive counseling on the following
alternative courses of action, and referral upon request:
-Prenatal care and delivery
-Infant care, foster care, or adoption
-Pregnancy termination.
Id. (emphasis in original). Several times prior to 1988 Congress rejected legislation that would
restrict abortion counseling in Title X clinics. See 120 CONG. REc. 21,687-95 (1974) (stating
rejection by House of proposed Title X amendment that would prohibit direct or indirect use
of fund for abortion referrals, inter alia); 121 CONG. Rac. 20,863-64 (1975) (stating rejection
by House of proposed Title X amendment that would prohibit payment for, promotion, or
encouragement of abortions by grantees); 124 CONG. Rc. 37,045 (1978) (stating rejection by
House of proposed amendment to Title X that would prohibit grants to entities providing
abortions or abortion counseling or referrals).
15. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1991). The regulations provide: "Title X program and Title X
project ... mean the identified program which is approved by the Secretary for support
under ... the Act .... Title X project funds include all funds, allocated to the Title X program,
including but not limited to grant funds, grant-related income or matching funds." Id.
16. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1991). The regulations provide:
Family planning means the process of establishing objectives for the number and
spacing of one's children and selecting the means by which those objectives may be
achieved.... Family planning does not include pregnancy care (including obstetric
or prenatal care). As required by section 1008 of the Act, abortion may not be
included as a method of family planning in the Title X project. Family planning,
as supported under this subpart, should reduce the incidence of abortion.
Id.
17. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1991). The regulations provide:
(a)(1) a Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion
as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of
family planning.
(2) Because Title X funds are intended only for family planning, once a client
served by a Title X project is diagnosed as pregnant, she must be referred for
appropriate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of available providers
that promote the welfare of mother and unborn child. She must also be provided
with information necessary to protect the health of mother and unborn child until
such time as the referral appointment is kept. In cases in which emergency care is
required, however, the Title X project shall be required only to refer the client
immediately to an appropriate provider of emergency medical services.
(3) A Title X project may not use prenatal, social service or emergency medical
or other referrals as an indirect means of encouraging or promoting abortion as a
method of family planning, such as by weighing the list of referrals in favor of
health care providers which perform abortions, by including on the list of referral
1026
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prohibited projects from using "Title X project funds," both federal and
private,' for lobbying, disseminating information, and engaging in activities
that advocate abortion as a method of family planning.' 9 Fourth, the
regulations required complete physical and financial separation of Title X
projects from organizations engaging in prohibited activities, including sep-
arate financial records, facilities, and personnel.20 As a practical matter, the
regulations required clinics receiving grants to refrain from abortion coun-
seling,21 even with private funds,22 and required the clinics to give all
providers health care providers whose principal business is the provision of abortions,
by excluding available providers who do not provide abortions, or by 'steering'
clients to providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.
Id.
18. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing redefinition in HHS regulations
of "Title X project funds" to encompass private funds, including clinic matching funds and
income).
19. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1991). The regulations provide:
(a) A Title X project may not encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a
method of family planning. This requiremert prohibits actions to assist women to
obtain abortions or increase the availability or accessibility of abortion for family
planning purposes. Prohibited actions include the use of Title X project funds for
the following:
(1) Lobbying for the passage of legislation to increase in any way the availability
of abortion as a method of family planning;
(2) Providing speakers to promote the use of abortion as a method of family
planning;
(3) Paying dues to any group that as a significant part of its activities advocates
abortion as a method of family planning;
(4) Using legal action to make abortion available in any way as a method of
family planning; and
(5) Developing or disseminating materials (including printed matter an audiovisual
materials) advocating abortion as a method of family planning.
Id.
20. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1991). The regulations provide:
A Title X project must be organized so that it is physically and financially separate,
as determined in accordance with the review established in this section, from activities
which are prohibited under section 1008 of the Act and § 59.8 [prohibiting counseling
and referral for abortion services] and § 59.10 [prohibiting activities that encourage,
promote or advocate abortion] of these regulations from inclusion in the Title X
program. In order to be physically and financially separate, a Title X project must
have an objective integrity and independence from prohibited activities. Mere book-
keeping separation of Title X funds from other monies is not sufficient .... Factors
relevant to this determination shall include (but are not limited to):
(a) The existence of separate accounting records;
(b) The degree of separation from facilities (e.g., treatment, consultation, exami-
nation, and waiting rooms) in which prohibited activities occur and the extent of
such prohibited activities;
(c) The existence of separate personnel;
(d) The extent to which signs and other forms of identification of the title X
project are present and signs and material promoting abortion are absent.
rd.
21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition of abortion coun-
seling in HHS regulations).
22. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing redefinition of "Title X project
funds" to include private clinic funds).
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pregnant patients referral information biased toward childbirth.z
Opponents24 of the regulations challenged on First and Fifth Amendment
grounds.Y They claimed that the regulations imposed content-discriminatory
censorship on recipient clinics and their staffs. 26 In a dissenting opinion
cited by other circuits, Judge Kearse of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that because of the combination of mandated probirth informa-
tion and prohibited abortion information, the regulations facially discrimi-
nated on the basis of viewpoint and controlled the content of the grantee's
speech.27 Opponents of the regulations argued that whatever the extent of
23. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing requirement in HHS regulations
that recipient clinics refer pregnant patients for prenatal services only).
24. Organizations receiving grants, clinic doctors, and clinic patients challenged the Title
X regulations in three suits. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp 1465
(granting preliminary injunction), 687 F. Supp. 540 (D.Colo. 1988) (granting permanent
injunction), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492
(10th Cir. 1990) (invalidating regulations on statutory and constitutional grounds); Massachu-
setts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D.Mass. 1988) (invalidating regulations on statutory and
constitutional grounds and enjoining enforcement), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Secretary
of HHS, 899 F.2d 53 (Ist Cir. 1990); New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (upholding regulations), aff'd sub nom. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.
1989), aff'd sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
25. Planned Parenthood, 680 F. Supp at 1467; Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp.
at 140; New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1264. In addition to claiming that the regulations
violated the First and Fifth Amendments, the challengers claimed that the regulations were
invalid on statutory grounds. Planned Parenthood, 680 F. Supp. at 542; Massachusetts v.
Bowen, 679 F. Supp. at 140; New York v. Bowen, 690 F .Supp. at 1264. See Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778-80 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that regulations were
impermissible construction of statute because they raised constitutional questions where plainly
constitutional construction was available); id. at 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same);
id. at 1786-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that regulations were impermissible because
they conflicted with unambiguous meaning of statute).
26. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1781-84 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that regulations impose content-based prior restraint on expression); Planned Parent-
hood Fed'n of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting New York
v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 415-15 (2d Cir. 1989) (Kearse, J., dissenting)) (same). See also
Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REv. 554, 573-74 (1991) (criticizing Rust decision as allowing
administrative interpretation of ambiguous statute to restrict speech in contravention of first
amendment goals).
27. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 416 (2d Cir. 1989) (Kearse, J., dissenting),
aff'd sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). Judge Kearse's opinion was cited by
the First Circuit, Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 72 (1990), and by the
Tenth Circuit, Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1500, 1502-
3 (1990). See also Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
wrote,
Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based suppression of speech
simply because that suppression was a condition upon the acceptance of public
funds.
The regulations are also clearly viewpoint-based. While suppressing speech favorable




the government's power to condition funding, that power stopped short of
imposing conditions that discriminate on the basis of speech content or
viewpoint.
28
Opponents also argued that the regulations violated the patient's Fifth
Amendment liberty interest in choosing whether to continue or terminate
her pregnancy. 29 The regulations erected an obstacle to a woman's freedom
to choose abortion because they interfered with the doctor-patient dialogue,
keeping the woman in ignorance of her options regarding appropriate
medical care.30 Because the regulations constrained private as well as public
funds,3' opponents concluded that the patient was in a worse position than
if the government had refrained from providing any subsidies.3 2 In the
absence of government subsidies, according to the opponents, those private
funds would be available to provide abortion counseling to the patient. 3
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the regulations.
3 4
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the regulations
28. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan,
913 F.2d at 1503. See also Massachusetts v. HHS, 899F.2d at 72-75 (arguing that conditioned
public benefit interfering with freedom of speech must pass strict scrutiny test and concluding
that new HHS regulations did not pass test).
29. Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d at 1501-03; Massachusetts v. HHS, 899
F.2d at 64-72; New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 416-18 (Kearse, J., dissenting) afr'd sub
nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
30. Rust, 111 S. Ct at 1784-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v.
Sullivan, 913 F.2d at 1500-01; Massachusetts v. HHS, 899 F.2d at 69-70; New York v. Sullivan,
889 F.2d. at 417 (Kearse, J., dissenting) aff'd sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991). Opponents argued that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state law
prohibiting abortions as unduly burdensome on constitutionally protected right to decide to
terminate pregnancy), Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state regulation denying
state Medicaid funds for certain medically necessary abortions as not infringing on right to
choose abortion), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding federal statute denying
federal Medicaid funds for certain medically necessary abortions as not infringing on right to
choose abortion), established a woman's right to be free of government interference with her
decision whether to terminate or continue her pregnancy. Opponents also argued that govern-
ment manipulation of the doctor-patient dialogue constituted impermissible government inter-
ference following Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(invalidating city ordinance requiring doctors to recite cautionary statements to abortion patients
as unconstitutional interference with doctor-patient dialogue and with patient's right to decide
on abortion) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (invalidating state statute requiring doctors to give abortion patients fetal devel-
opment information and list of agencies providing abortion alternatives as unconstitutional
interference with doctor-patient dialogue and with patient's right to decide on abortion).
31. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing redefinition of "Title X project
funds" to encompass private funds, including clinic matching funds and income).
32. Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 70 (1st Cir. 1990) (concluding that
by not only refusing to fund abortions, but also restricting nongovernmental money for
abortion services, new HHS regulations create additional obstruction to exercise of woman's
right to reproductive choice). Besides restricting the amount of private money available to
support abortion counseling, the regulations also leave a woman in a worse position because
clients pay for clinic services according to income, and therefore clients depart a clinic with
reduced ability to purchase other services. Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d at 1500
33. Massachusetts v. HHS, 899 F.2d at 70.
34. Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (1991). Justices White, Kennedy, Scalia, and
1992] 1029
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did not interfere with First or Fifth Amendment rights but merely declined
to subsidize the exercise of those rights.35 The Chief Justice rejected the
claim that the regulations imposed a viewpoint-discriminatory condition on
receipt of a government benefit.16 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded instead
that the regulations were a legitimate means of implementing a government
value judgment to favor and subsidize one activity-family planning services
leading to conception and childbirth-and not to favor or subsidize an-
Souter joined in the Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court. Id. Justices Blackmun,
Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor dissented. Id.
35. Rust 111 S. Ct. at 1772, 1776-77. The Court relied on Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977), Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989) for the proposition that the government decision to fund childbirth services
but not abortion services does not violate either the First Amendment right of free speech or
the Fifth Amendment right to choose abortion. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776-78. In Maher and
Harris the Court upheld laws denying Medicaid funding of certain medically necessary abor-
tions, reasoning that a government value judgment to fund childbirth but not abortion did
not infringe on a woman's right to choose abortion. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; Harris, 448 U.S.
at 315; see supra note 30 (discussing use of Maher and Harris by opponents of regulations
for proposition that woman has right to be free of government interference with decision
whether to terminate pregnancy). Neither Maher nor Harris raised First Amendment issues.
In Webster the Court upheld a Missouri law prohibiting the use of public facilities or employees
to perform abortions. Webster, 492 U.S. at 499. The law at issue also prohibited the use of
public funds, employees, and facilities for encouraging or counseling abortions not necessary
to save the client's life. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215 (1986). The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals struck down this portion of the law, as well as the portion relating
to performance of abortions. Reproductive Health Service v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1079
(8th Cir. 1988), rev'd Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Missouri
did not appeal the circuit court decision regarding the use of public facilities and employees
for abortion counseling. Webster, 492 U.S. at 503-04. In its appeal of the decision regarding
the use of public funds, Missouri stated that the law was directed not at any health care
provider, public or private, but rather at those responsible for expending public funds. Id.
The parties challenging the law withdrew their opposition on that basis, and the Court declared
the issue moot. Id. Therefore, the Webster Court did not address the question of whether the
state law could constitutionally prohibit use of publicly subsidized facilities and employees for
abortion counseling.
The Rust Court also relied on Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540
(1983), for the proposition that the government's refusal to subsidize a right does not infringe
that right. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772-75. In Regan the Court upheld a statute that denied tax
deductions for contributions to organizations that lobby but granted deductions for contribu-
tions to nonlobbying organizations and to any veterans' organizations. Regan, 461 U.S. at
546-49. The Regan Court noted that because the statute allowed a lobbying organization to
isolate its lobbying activity in a distinct corporate structure, thereby preserving tax deductibility
for contributions for nonlobbying activities, the statute merely represented Congress' refusal
to subsidize lobbying and did not unduly burden the First Amendment right of free speech.
Id. at 544-47. The Rust Court reasoned that the HHS regulations followed the tax provision
in Regan, allowing Title X projects to set up separate organizations to engage in abortion
counseling that the government chose not to subsidize, while retaining eligibility for Title X
grants for organizations not engaging in abortion counseling. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775. But
cf. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780-82 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (arguing that Regan is inapposite to
Rust because Regan rested on content neutrality of lobbying ban, whereas HHS regulations
discriminate on basis of viewpoint); Massachusetts v. HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 74-75 (same).
36. Rust, Il1 S. Ct. at 1772.
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other-promotion or encouragement of abortion. 37 According to the Chief
Justice, the regulations did not impose an unconstitutional condition on
receipt of grant funds because the regulations did not require clinics or
staffs to forsake abortion counseling but only required that such speech be
separate from funded activities. 8 Clinic operators and staff members re-
mained free to discuss abortion at other times and in other places, outside
the Title X program.3 9
It did not matter, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the
regulations imposed the speech restriction on privately funded clinic activi-
ties, because the clinics were free to decline the Title X funds.4 0 As for
clinic employees, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the restriction on
abortion speech did not involve their First Amendment rights because the
restriction was a condition of voluntary employment and applied only at
the worksite.41 The Chief Justice noted that there might be exceptions to
the government's power to control speech through funding conditions, even
though speech outside the funded project remains unfettered. 42 One such
exception, according to the Chief Justice, might be funding conditions that
impinge on the doctor-patient relationship. 43 However, the Chief Justice
declined to decided the matter, concluding that the HHS regulations did
not impinge on the doctor-patient relationship.44 Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that the regulations did not require doctors to represent any opinion
as their own,45 and that, because the program provided only family planning
services, the relationship between clinic doctors and clinic patients was not
sufficiently all-encompassing to lead the patient to expect comprehensive
medical advice.46
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1775.
39. Id. at 1774-75.
40. Id. at 1775 n.5. But see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 40-102 (1988) (examining history
and current application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine from economic perspective and
criticizing conditioned government spending for allowing inherent wealth transfers, for offend-
ing liberties, and for being inherently coercive); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARv. L. Rav. 1413, 1450-56 (1989) (describing shortcomings of theory of
coercion in testing conditioned benefits); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Condi-
tions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B.U.L. Rav. 593, 601-04 (1990) (criticizing distinction
between penalties and subsidies in analysis of conditioned benefits).
41. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775 (1991). But see supra note 40 (citing
commentary criticizing distinction between voluntariness and coercion).




46. Id. But see infra notes 114-15 (citing arguments that clinic patient is likely to rely
on doctor's statements as complete and unbiased); infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text
(describing state law and professional ethical requirement that doctor fully inform patient of
treatment options).
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Neither did the Chief Justice find affirmative government interference
with the Fifth Amendment right of clinic clients to choose abortions.4 7 The
Chief Justice reasoned that the government has no duty to subsidize the
exercise of a right.4 Further, according to the Chief Justice, the government
places no obstacle in the path of a woman by subsidizing childbirth but
not abortion because the refusal to subsidize abortion leaves the woman in
no worse position than if the government had chosen to subsidize nothing.
49
Nor did The Chief Justice accept the related argument that, because they
interfered with the doctor-patient relationship, the regulations violated a
woman's Fifth Amendment right to make informed medical choices. 0 The
HHS regulations, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, left unfettered doctor-
patient communications outside the Title X program.5 The Chief Justice
noted that clinic patients might find it difficult to go elsewhere for abortion
information, but that difficulty was the result of their poverty and not of
any state-imposed obstacle. 2 The Chief Justice again concluded that the
regulations leave patients no worse off than if the government had not
enacted Title X, and therefore did not violate Fifth Amendment rights. 3
II. POWER ANALYSIS
A. Context: The Failure of Familiar Approaches
The arguments of Chief Justice Rehnquist and of opponents of the
Rust opinion reveal a polarized dispute in which both sides advocate legal
characterizations, each well-supported by precedent. The opponents char-
acterize the regulations as imposing an unconstitutional condition on receipt
of a government benefit.54 The proponents characterize the regulations as
47. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776-78 (1991).
48. Id. at 1776; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing Rust Court's
reasoning that government has no duty to subsidize exercise of constitutional right).
49. Rust, III S. Ct. at 1776-77. But see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text
(describing increased availability of privately-funded services in absence of Title X restrictions).
50. Rust, IIl S. Ct. at 1777-78. Rehnquist distinguished Rust from Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) and Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), on the basis that these cases
imposed communication requirements on all doctors, whether or not they received public
funds. Id. at 1777. In contrast, according to Rehnquist, the Rust regulations did not interfere
with doctor-patient communications outside the federally subsidized program. Id. But see supra
note 30 (discussing opponents' use of Thornburgh and Akron for proposition that government
interference with doctor-patient dialogue constituted government interference with right to
choose abortion).
51. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
52. Id. at 1778.
53. Id.
54. See Alvaro I. Inillo, Note, The National Endowment for the Humanities: Control
of Funding Versus Academic Freedom, 45 VAD. L. Rnv. 455, 478-79 (1992) (arguing that
Rust narrows unconstitutional conditions doctrine but leaves intact constitutional protection
against suppression of dangerous ideas); Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions
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reasonably related to implementation of a legitimate legislative program.5
Neither approach is satisfying. They produce inconsistent and illogical
results, and, like the blind men and the elephant, they examine pieces rather
than the whole.
The Rust opponents invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
arguing that government may not condition a benefit on forsaking a
constitutional right, 56 or at least may not do so without compelling reason.57
Otherwise, government could eradicate individual rights through inducement
or coercion when it could not constitutionally restrict those rights by direct
regulation.18 The doctrine fails as an analytical tool because it offers no
consistent method of deciding whether a government interest is sufficiently
compelling, and therefore produces inconsistent results.5 9 The Rust oppo-
nents used the doctrine to argue that executive responsibility for fiscal and
as "Nonsubsidies':" When Is Deference Inappropriate?, 80 GEo L. J. 131 (1991) (arguing that
following Rust, Court will view most allocational schemes affecting constitutional rights as
presumptively valid policy decisions); supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (presenting
opponents' argument that regulations imposed unconstitutional viewpoint-discriminatory con-
dition on receipt of funding).
55. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (presenting majority argument in Rust that
regulations were legitimate means of implementing legitimate government policy).
56. Rust v. Sullivan, IlI S. Ct. 1759, 1780, 1782-83 (1991). See Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (arguing that government may not deny benefit based on individual's
exercise of constitutional right); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (same); Massa-
chusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 72-73 (1st Cir. 1990) (same). The seminal
unconstitutional conditions case is Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), in which
the Court held that a state could not require trucks to be common carriers as a condition of
using state roads. Id. at 594. See also LAWRENcE TRIBE, AmamIcAN CONsTTTIoNAL LAw, §
10-8 at 681 n.29 (2d ed. 1988) (citing cases and commentary on unconstitutional conditions
doctrine); Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amend-
ment, 39 CASE W. Rrs. L. Rsv. 97 (1988-89), reprinted in 1990 FIRST AmEtNDm:ENr LAW
HANDBOOK 209, 209-13 (James L. Swanson & Christian L. Castle, eds., 1990) (describing
history and current status of unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Roberta J. Sharp, Holding
Abortion Speech Hostage: Conditions on Federal Funding of Private Population Planning
Activities, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1218, 1230 n.117 (1991) (describing commentary on
conceptual underpinnings of unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Sunstein, supra note 40, at
596-604 (describing history, current meaning, and deficiencies of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
57. Rust, 111 S. Ct at 1783-84 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); Massachusetts v. HHS, 899
F.2d at 73. See Fuhr, supra note 56, at 213 (describing Court's weighing of government
interests in imposing conditions impinging on constitutional rights).
58. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271
U.S. 583, 594 (1926). The Frost Court said, "If the state may compel the surrender of one
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of
all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may
thus be manipulated out of existence." Id. See Fuhr, supra note 56, at 209-10 (describing
fundamental question in unconstitutional conditions cases as why government should be able
to indirectly achieve waiver of constitutional right when it may not directly limit right without
compelling reason); Sunstein, supra note 40, at 601 (describing heart of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as principal that government may not do indirectly what it may not do
directly).
59. See Fuhr, supra note 56, at 213 (describing weakness of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as inconsistent analysis of whether condition is permissible).
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substantive control of government programs was not a sufficiently compel-
ling justification for government restraint of workplace speech in subsidized
programs.6 However, in other circumstances the Court has applied the
doctrine to hold that promoting the efficiency and facial neutrality of the
public service is sufficiently compelling to justify government restraint of
the private political activities of its employees .6 By itself, the doctrine does
not explain why workplace efficiency justifies restriction of private political
participation, but program control does not justify restriction of workplace
speech and activities.
The rational basis test of spending power used by the proponents of
Rust is also an inadequate analytical tool. Under this test, government may
impose conditions on public benefits as long as the conditions reasonably
relate to the purpose of the benefit and do not aim primarily at suppressing
ideas,6 and as long as acceptance of the benefit is voluntary.63 One short-
coming of this test is that it imposes no limits on what constitutes a
reasonable relationship between the condition and government purpose. In
an earlier case the Court stretched "reasonably related" to encompass the
attenuated connection between a state's drinking age and a-federal purpose
to promote construction of a national highway system. 4 The Rust Court
found that the condition that Title X grant recipients refrain from certain
unsubsidized activities was a reasonable implementation of the government's
right to fund one activity but not another.6 On this reasoning, the fact of
any government subsidy provides a sufficient basis for prohibiting the
recipient from engaging in unsubsidized activities, including unsubsidized
speech."
A second shortcoming of the rational basis test is that it imposes no
practical limit on the meaning of the term "voluntary." The rationale of
the voluntariness standard is that as long as an individual is free to decline
60. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 97-99 (1947); see United States Civil
Serv. Comm. v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 555-56 (1973) (reaffirming
government power to restrict private political activity of employees to serve interest of efficient
public service).
62. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
According to then-Justice Rehnquist, "[W]hen the Government is simply exercising its power
to allocate its own public funds, we need only find that the condition imposed has a rational
relationship to Congress' purpose in providing the subsidy and that it is not primarily aimed
at the suppression of dangerous ideas." Id. (citation omitted). See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct.
1759, 1772-73 (1991) (finding reasonable relationship between funding condition and program
purpose, and concluding that regulations do not aim at suppression of dangerous ideas).
63. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775, 1775 n.5 (describing acceptance as voluntary on part
of grant recipients and their employees).
64. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
65. Rust, I II S. Ct. at 1772-73.
66. See id. (arguing that government may prohibit grantee from engaging in activities
outside program scope because "[w]ithin far broader limits than petitioners are willing to
concede, when the government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled
to define the limits of that program").
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a government benefit, a condition requiring waiver of a constitutional right
is not coercive. 67 However, when government subsidies reach virtually all
essential services, the term "voluntary" loses its meaning.6 The Rust Court
is disingenuous in describing as voluntary an employee's decision to refrain
from certain speech rather than forego the benefit of keeping her job.
69
Both the spending power rational basis test and the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine share a more fundamental analytical failure. Both are
flawed by tunnel vision; they look at discrete, isolated pieces of constitu-
tional rights and government power rather than at the dynamics of the
reciprocal relationship between rights and government power. The question
concerns the allocation of power, and the allocation is dynamic; a change
in the kind or amount of power held by either the government or the
individual changes the kind and amount of power held by the other. An
adequate analytical framework will encompass this dynamic relationship and
will account for forces contributing to changes in it, particularly the very
pervasive role of information."°
B. A New Approach: Power Analysis
The framers of the Bill of Rights recognized the interconnection between
power and information: the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment
restrains government power and protects citizen political autonomy by
preventing government interference with the free flow of information.
7'
67. Fuhr, supra note 56, at 214-15; see Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775, 1775
n.5, 1777-78 (1991) (describing Title X grant recipients, employees, and patients as free to
decline benefits of government grants). But see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
(describing benefit granted or denied based on exercise of constitutional rights as penalizing
and inhibiting right); supra note 40 (citing commentary critical of voluntariness standard);
sources cited infra note 68 (criticizing distinction between voluntariness and coercion).
68. See Fuhr, supra note 56, at 214-15 (describing failure of characterizations based on
offer or threat to distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional conditions on gov-
ernment benefits); Sullivan, supra note 40, at 1451-56 (arguing that pervasiveness of government
activity and government monopoly over some essential services increases coerciveness of
conditioned government benefits); Sunstein, supra note 40, at 604 (arguing that distinction
between subsidies and penalties fades in light of omnipresent government funding).
69. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775 (describing speech restrictions on clinic employees as
condition of voluntary employment).
70. See MARK G. YUDOF, WIMN GovRNRmtEN Sr EAs 23-24 (1983) (arguing that com-
munication is essential element of organization and action and that communication and control
between government and individuals is dynamic and mutually affecting); see also Leedes, supra
note 9, at 112-120 (criticizing Rust decision for exacerbating concentration of power in politically
unaccountable bureaucracies that disempower individual and advocating discourse ethics model
of open, moral communication and participation in policy decisions).
71. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Beliotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (reasoning that
First Amendment protects freedom of discussion about all matters on which individuals need
information); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (arguing that
"We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in
power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority."); DAviD S. BOOEN, BuLWaKu OF LBERTY:
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Commentators and courts have recognized that government interference
with information and expression can undermine citizen political autonomy. 72
In the same way, freedom of expression and the subsequent free flow of
information underlie any citizen liberty or right of decision, and government
restriction of information and expression poses a threat to liberty.73 The
connection between information and individual autonomy is the basis for
the Court's decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council.74 The Virginia Pharmacy Court struck down a state
THE COURT AND THE FIRST AaENImmNT, 16-20 (describing reliance framers placed on freedom
of slieech as protector of liberty); Edward H. Zeigler, Jr., Government Speech and the
Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REv. 578, 578-79 (1980) (arguing
principal concern of founding fathers was government ability to influence expression and
formation of citizen opinion posing threat to democratic process). Bogen argues that the
phrase, "bulwark of liberty," used in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights and in James
Madison's original free speech proposal, originated in the following passage from Cato's
Letters: .'Freedom of Speech is the great Bulwark of Liberty; they prosper and Die together."'
Bogen, supra at 17 (quoting John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters: Essay on
Liberty, Civil and Religious, I, 100 (1755)). Bogen argues that the framers drew their
understanding of the purpose of freedom of speech in large part from Cato's Letters, and
cites this passage from Number 15:
Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no such Thing as Wisdom; and no such
Thing as publick Liberty, without Freedom of Speech: Which is the Right of every
Man, as far as by it he does not hurt and controul the Right of another; and this
is the only Check which it ought to suffer, the only Bounds which it ought to know.
Id. at 18, quoting Cato's Letters, I, 96.
72. See Janet Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion
Information and the First Amendment, 101 HAgv. L. REv. 1916, 1923 (1988) (arguing that
First Amendment is check on government indoctrination which undermines democratic self
governance and individual liberty); Farber, supra note 26, at 556-62 (using economic analysis
to draw connection between free speech and information, particularly political information,
as public good); YurDOF, supra note 70, at 6-12 (summarizing dangers government expression
poses for democratic process); supra note 71 (listing cases and source that recognize government
interference with expression as threat to liberty). Benshoof examines government-mandated
information bias under the Adolescent Family Life Act (Act). Id. The Act provided grants for
programs serving adolescents, and required grantees to stress sexual abstinence and adoption
and to refrain from counseling about abortion. Id. at 1917-18. Benshoof argues that the speech
restrictions constituted unconstitutional censorship and viewpoint discrimination aimed at a
particularly vulnerable population. Id. at 1923, 1925-26. Benshoof concludes that the govern-
ment information manipulation denied women the right to make informed choices and denied
the democratic process the benefits of free and open debate. Id. at 1936.
73. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (noting First
Amendment purpose to preserve free marketplace of ideas). The Red Lion Court said:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoli-
zation of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private li-
censee .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right
may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
Id. See supra notes 71-72 (citing cases and sources that recognize government interference with
expression as threat to liberty).
74. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices,
reasoning that the free flow of price information was essential to intelligent
and well-informed private economic decisions.7 5
The English sociologist Steven Lukes has developed a model of power
analysis comprehensive enough to encompass both the dynamic relationship
between government power and individual rights and the special role of
expression and information in creating and limiting power. 76 Lukes's frame-
work traces power in three dimensions: decisional power, agenda power,
and manipulative power.7 7 The first dimension, decisional power, is the
ability to decide the outcome of an issue in conflict. 78 This dimension of
power supports the concept of democratic pluralism in which persons of
equal individual power join together to form blocks of greater or lesser
power based on membership size.7 9 Lukes's second dimension, agenda power,
is the ability to determine what issues will and will not be raised for
decisionA0 To the extent that A has agenda power over B, A can negate
B's first dimension power to make decisions by foreclosing B's decision
75. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976). The Virginia Pharmacy Court reasoned that even purely commercial speech
contributes to the public interest in free flowing information because such information is
essential to intelligent opinions relevant to self-governance as well as to private economic
decisions. Id. at 763-65.
76. Luxss, supra note 8. Lukes defines power as follows: "A exercises power over B
when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests." Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 11-45. Lukes labels the power dimensions "first," "second," and "third,"
rather than "decisional," "agenda," and "manipulative." The latter terms, used here for
clarity and convenience, also convey simplicity and mutual exclusion inconsistent with Lukes'
conception of the three dimensions. Lukes' three dimensions are not discrete, but rather are
overlapping and interactive aspects of a dynamic power system. Id. at 27. See JOHN GAVENTA,
POWER mw Powan.EssN ss, 20-25 (1982) (describing interrelationships among Lukes' three
dimensions of power).
78. Luras, supra note 8, at 11-15. Lukes analyzes and builds on the pluralist view of
power espoused by, among others, ROBERT A. DAm., WHO GovEmNs: DEMOCRACY AND POWER
IN AN AmEicAN CrrY (1961) and NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNTY POWER AND PoLTICAL
THEORY (1963). Id. According to Lukes, A exercises first dimension power over B to the
extent that A prevails over B in decision making on a contested issue. Id. at 15.
79. LuKEs, supra note 8, at 11-12. See POLSBY, supra note 78, at 123-32 (arguing that
apparent concentration of decision making among elite leaders masks underlying participation
by community members in policy decisions).
80. Luans, supra note 8, at 16-20. Lukes analyzes and builds on the views of power
espoused by, among others, Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz in The Two Faces of Power,
56 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 947 (1962) and Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,
57 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 641 (1963). Id. According to Bachrach and Barantz, "'to the extent
that a person or group-consciously or unconsciously-creates or reinforces barriers to the
public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has [second dimension] power."' PETER
BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARANTz, POWER AND POvERTY, THEORY AND PRACTICE 6-8 (1970),
quoted in LuKns, supra note 8, at 16. See E.E. SCHATTSC NEMER, THE SE~M-SovmmoN
PEOPLE: A RALsr's Vw OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 8 (1960) (arguing that all political
organization constitutes mobilization of bias because some issues are inevitably organized into
decision-making structure and some are organized out).
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making opportunities."1 A special aspect of these two dimensions of power
is that they function in circumstances of overt conflict.
8 2
Unlike decisional and agenda power, third dimension power does not
operate in a climate of conflict, but rather prevents circumstances of overt
conflict from occurring by creating a manipulated consensus.8 3 Manipulative
power is the ability to shape the wants and perceptions of another. 4 This
power operates primarily through manipulation of information."s Third
dimension power is the most effective form of power because it insidiously
gains the support, or at least the neutrality, of others even to their own
detriment.8 6 A, by manipulating B's perceptions, can eviscerate any power
that B might have to contribute to the agenda or make decisions.87
An example will illustrate Lukes's power analysis. In 1976 when Cali-
fornia voters were about to vote on a referendum on commercial nuclear
power, the United States Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) produced and distributed to voters thousands of pamphlets designed
to influence voters with misleading information about nuclear reactor safety.'
In this situation the voters as a group held the first dimension power of
the ballot. More accurately, those voters who were members of the majority
held first dimension power to decide the outcome. Although it is not clear
who held second dimension power to get the issue on the decisional agenda
or to exclude other issues, it is likely that some group of citizens, helped
or hindered by government institutions, exercised enough agenda power to
force the referendum. ERDA tried to exercise third dimension power to
shape the perceptions of the voters. It distributed biased information under
circumstances that were likely to induce belief in the audience. ERDA was
a government agency with specialized knowledge, so its pamphlets carried
the authority of official, and thus apparently neutral, expertise. However,
much other information reached the voters through other communication
channels at no cost to the voter. Therefore, in spite of its efforts, ERDA
81. BACHRACH & BARANTz, POWER AND POVERTY, supra note 80, at 7, quoted in LUKES,
supra note 8, at 16.
82. LuKEs, supra note 8, at 15, 20.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. According to Lukes, "A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what
he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or
determining his very wants." Id. See GAVENTA, supra note 77, at 68-81 (explaining absence
of rebellion among appalachian miners, in spite of brutal exploitation by mine operators, on
basis of mine operators' and regional government entities' exercise of third dimension power).
85. LuKEs, supra note 8, at 23. Lukes identifies control of information, the mass media,
and socialization as three examples of third dimension power in action. Id. See GAVENTA,
supra note 77, at 15-20 (discussing mechanisms of third dimension power including information
control and psychological adaptations to powerlessness).
86. LuKEs, supra note 8, at 23-24.
87. Id.
88. Zeigler, supra note 71, at 583 (relying on U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION, SHEDDING LioH ON FACTS ABOUT NUCLEAR ENERGY (1976), reproduced in
GENERAL AcCOuNTING OFncE REPORT No. B-130961 (Sept. 30, 1976)).
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was unlikely to have exercised enough third dimension manipulative power
to undermine the right of voters to decide how to vote.
This example also illustrates that third dimension power to manipulate
perceptions and decisions rests on control of information and increases
under two conditions. First, third dimension power increases along with
increases in monopoly control of expression, either through control of the
channels of expression or through control of the source of relevant infor-
mation.89 A monopoly may exist as to some listeners because of the cost
or risk of seeking other information. For example, the ban on price
advertising in Virginia Pharmacy did not prohibit customers from going
from pharmacy to pharmacy to learn and compare pricesY° However,
individualized comparison shopping carries a cost in effort, time, and
possibly risk to the health of a customer in immediate need of a prescription.
Therefore, even though other sources were available, the customer's local
pharmacy held some monopoly control of price information. The second
condition increasing third dimension power is an aura of trustworthiness
attached to information. 9' When the speaker is respected, holds official
authority, is an expert, or is otherwise likely to induce belief, the speaker
has greater power to shape the perceptions of the listeners.
III. PowER ANALYSIS OF A TiTE X CIic
Power analysis allows one to look inside a Title X clinic and to identify
the nature and amount of power allocated to each participant in a doctor-
patient consultation. The analysis focuses on the right of the patient to
decide her treatment, her first dimension decisional power. The analysis
necessarily examines another right, that of the doctor to decide what to say
during the consultation, because the patient's power to decide depends on
what her doctor tells her.92 As long as the patient retains first dimension
decisional power, she retains a real right to choose her medical treatment.
Prior to Rust, the legal relationship between doctor and patient rested
on the common-law principles of ethical professional practice embodied in
the informed consent doctrine.93 This doctrine encompassed two interde-
89. See LuKEs, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that thought control occurs through control
of information and of means of information delivery such as mass media); GAVENTA, supra
note 77, at 15-16 (noting that understanding of third dimension power involves examination
of the information communicated and the means of communication).
90. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 752 (1976) (stating that Virginia statute prohibited only pharmacists' dissemination of
prescription drug information).
91. See Luscs, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that appearance of legitimacy in person
exercising power enables third dimension power); GAVENTA, supra note 77, at 15-16 (noting
that third dimension power operates when person exercising power has apparent legitimacy).
92. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (describing debilitating effect of third
dimension power on first dimension power, and information as mechanism of third dimension
power).
93. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846-47 (1990) (recognizing
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pendent principles. First, the patient had a right to make her own medical
decisions with the advice of her doctor,94 and second, her decisions did not
constitute valid consent unless she understood reasonable medical alterna-
tives and risks.95 The doctor had a legal9 and ethical9 duty to fully inform
her of medical alternatives and risks even when the doctor did not perform
the medical treatment, but rather referred the patient elsewhere.98 The
primary federal role in the doctor-patient relationship prior to Rust was
providing subsidies for certain treatments and services.Y
Whether the patient held real first dimension power to decide her
treatment depended on the distribution and operation of agenda power and
manipulative power, which turned on freedom of expression and on practical
that common law doctrine of informed consent expresses patient's right of self-determination);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986)
(invalidating law requiring doctor to convey certain information to patients because ensuring
informed consent is primarily doctor's responsibility and rigid requirements mandating delivery
of information intruded on doctor discretion); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 442-44 (1983) (relying on Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)) (recognizing informed consent as encompassing patient's
right to make medical decisions without interference and with full knowledge of nature and
consequences of decision); 1 PRESmENT'S COMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvioRAL. RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS:
THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER
RELATIONSHIP 2 (1982) [hereinafter President's Commission] (noting that informed consent
doctrine encompasses legal and ethical requirements).
94. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847-48 (recognizing patient's right of self-determination
in medical decisionmaking); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759 (invalidating state requirements
relating to abortion as state "effort to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her
physician, is hers to make"); Akron 462 U.S. at 433-44 (invalidating city requirements
interfering with doctor's duty to inform abortion patients and constituting government effort
to influence woman's informed choice); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (upholding state requirement that patient give written consent for
abortion because state had legitimate interest in ensuring patient's full knowledge and consent);
sources cited supra note 93 (supporting legal consent doctrine).
95. See sources cited supra notes 93-94 (supporting informed consent doctrine).
96. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 443
(1983) (noting that "[i]t remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that
appropriate information is conveyed to the patient"). See sources cited supra note 93-94
(supporting informed consent doctrine).
97. President's Commission, supra note 93, at 2; AMA, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAs 8.08 (1992) [hereinafter AMA] (stating that doctor
has ethical obligation to help patient make choices from among therapeutic alternatives
consistent with good medical practice).
98. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839-40 (N.J. 1981) (holding that pediatrician
of child with hereditary disease had duty to inform parents that future children were at risk,
even though pediatrician would not have provided prenatal medical care); AMA, supra note
97, at 3.05 (imposing full ethical duties on doctor even though doctor chooses to limit practice
to specialized services).
99. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-26 (1980) (upholding congressional authority
to refuse Medicaid funding for certain abortions); see also supra note 35 and accompanying
text (describing government authority to subsidize one activity but not another, even when
unsubsidized activity is constitutionally protected).
1040
RUST v. SULLIVAN
availability of and control over information.' °° For the patient, the clinic
doctor held a monopoly on information relevant to her decision. The
relevant information was specialized and patient-specific, so the patient
could not obtain it by visiting a library or talking to neighbors.' 0 Only a
doctor could give it to her. A patient could see alternative doctors only by
incurring significant economic cost and potential health risk of delayed
treatment.1°2 Further, the speech of the doctor had a high degree of apparent
trustworthiness.0 3 The doctor was an expert bound by law and ethics to
look after the interests of the patient. 1°4 The combination of monopoly
control of information and apparent trustworthiness gave the doctor second
dimension power to set the patient's agenda of treatment choices and third
dimension power to manipulate the patient's decision. 0
However, government intervention under the traditional informed con-
sent doctrine limited the doctor's ability to exercise third dimension power
by undermining the doctor's information monopoly. State law required the
doctor to set an agenda broad enough to encompass all reasonable treatments
and to convey information sufficient for the patient to understand her
options and make an informed decision.2° Although the doctor had broad
discretion to express recommendations and preferences, the law required
the doctor to convey complete, factually neutral information relevant to the
patient's decision. The purpose and effect of government intervention in
doctor-patient expression was to enhance the patient's autonomy in deciding
her treatment.
In contrast, government intervention in medical expression under Rust
does not mitigate the potential effects of third dimension power, but instead
forces the doctor to exercise second and third dimension power in a way
contrary to the patient's real interests.1 °7 The federal government now has
100. See supra part II.B (describing interrelationships of first, second, and third dimension
power and role of information).
101. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1500-01 (10th
Cir. 1990) (noting that Title X patients are unlikely to possess adequate medical knowledge
about abortion and have no access to such knowledge outside Title X clinics).
102. See Massachusetts v. HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 67, 70 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that some
Title X patients cannot obtain abortion information outside Title X clinics and that clinic fee
schedules increase with patient's capacity to pay, thereby diminishing patient's ability to obtain
other medical services).
103. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1785 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting
that doctor-patient relationship embodies special trust and that patient relies on information
from doctor as complete and in patient's best interest); Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913
F.2d at 1500 (arguing that statutory promise of comprehensive family planning services lures
women into using Title X clinics and into relying on clinic advice as complete).
104. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (describing informed consent doctrine
as mandating that doctor inform patient of relevant information and treatments).
105. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (describing second and third dimension
power and role of information).
106. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (describing doctor's duties under
informed consent doctrine).
107. It is significant to questions of federalism that the Rust decision shifted power to
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Rust-approved power, if it chooses to provide a partial subsidy of medical
services, to promote one treatment option by requiring the doctor both to
present information favorable to that option and to refrain from discussing
other options. 08 Doctors providing all-encompassing medical services might
be immune under the First Amendment, °9 but "all-encompassing" service
may be a difficult standard to meet. In Rust, "a broad range of acceptable
and effective family planning methods and services"" 0 was insufficiently
all-encompassing to invoke First Amendment protection."' The doctor's
duty to disclose options and relevant information under state law and
professional ethics still exists but is limited to those areas not governed by
federal funding conditions.
1 2
Under these circumstances the government uses the doctor's monopoly
control of information and apparent trustworthiness for the purpose of
manipulating the patient's decision."' The patient remains vulnerable to this
power for the same reasons that she was vulnerable before Rust. The agenda
and information biases are invisible to the patient. As the patient listens to
her doctor speak, she has no reason to suspect that the doctor is concealing
information about a treatment that might better serve her interests or
promoting a treatment that the doctor may not believe is best." 4 The
regulate doctor-patient communication from the states to the federal government. See infra
note 112 (describing HHS position that regulations supersede conflicting state law). However,
from the perspective of the patient manipulated by third dimension power, it matters little
whether the manipulator is a state or nation.
108. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing Rust reasoning allowing
speech conditions on grant recipients and employees of subsidized programs); supra notes 65-
66 and accompanying text (describing reach of rational basis test encompassing funding
conditions that prohibit unsubsidized activities).
109. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (describing Court dictum implying
special first amendment protection against speech-based funding conditions for certain doctor-
patient relationships).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1988).
111. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (describing Court reasoning that Title
X clinic doctors did not provide sufficiently all-encompassing services to create doctor-patient
relationship warranting special first amendment protection from funding conditions affecting
speech).
112. Public comments filed on the proposed regulations included objections based on the
regulations' conflict with state laws regarding informed consent. 53 Fed. Reg. 2928-29 (1988).
The Secretary of HHS dispensed with these objections by saying that to the extent the
regulations were inconsistent with state law, the regulations would prevail under the supremacy
clause. 53 Fed. Reg. 2933 (1988).
113. The government made clear its intent to prevent abortions, stating, "Family planning,
as supported under this subpart, should reduce the incidence of abortion." 42 C.F.R. § 59.2
(1988). See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1785 (1991) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (noting
that "[i]t is crystal clear that the aim of the challenged provisions-an aim that the majority
cannot escape noticing-is not simply to ensure that federal funds are not used to perform
abortions, but to 'reduce the incidence of abortion').
114. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.3
(10th Cir. 1990) (arguing that in context of neutral medical consultation, doctor's failure to




circumstances of the consultation room induce the patient to believe and
rely on her doctor's statements." 5 Even if the patient suspects that other
information and treatments might be available, she has no way to find out
about them without incurring cost andi risk." 6 For poor patients there are
no second opinions and no private doctors." 7 Therefore, the patient's first
dimension power to decide treatment is illusory." 8
115. See id. (noting patient's likely reliance on doctor's statements and omissions to fairly
represent legal and medical options); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1785 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (noting that patient is likely to rely on doctor's statements as fully representing
her medical options). Justice Blackmun argued:
Although her physician's words, in fact, are strictly controlled by the Government
and wholly unrelated to her particular medical situation, the Title X client will
reasonably construe them as professional advice to forgo her right to obtain an
abortion.... The specialized nature of medical science and the emotional distress
often attendant to health-related decisions requires that patients place their complete
confidence, and often their very lives, in the hands of medical professionals.
Id.
116. See supra notes 10, 32 (giving economic status of clinic patients and describing effect
of income-based clinic fees on patient ability to seek medical information elsewhere). The
regulations' prohibition on providing abortion information may go as far as to prohibit clinics
from allowing patients access to the yellow pages phone directory, lest patients use it to
discover names of abortion providers. Critics of the proposed regulations complained that the
regulations prohibited clinics from keeping the yellow pages. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988). The
Secretary of HHS responded that the regulations did not prohibit "keeping" yellow pages.
Id. at 2941. In its majority opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted "keeping"
to include "providing" yellow pages to clinic patients upon request. New York v. Sullivan,
889 F.2d 401, 406 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989). The concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed with
the majority, arguing that the Secretary's use of "keeping" did not include "providing," and
therefore under the regulations clinics could not give patients access to the yellow pages. Id.
at 415 (Caramone, J., concurring); id. at 416-17 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (noting that Secretary
of HHS stated in oral argument that clinics could not provide yellow pages to patients).
Of course, a woman could seek abortion information by consulting a yellow pages
directory outside a Title X clinic, but "a telephone book seems a poor substitute for the
advice of one's doctor." Id. at 416 (Kearse, J., dissenting). However, for a clinic patient,
poverty and the fact that she has just paid an income-based clinic fee effectively exclude her
from private providers and second opinions.
117. See supra notes 10, 32 (giving economic status of clinic patients and describing effect
of income-based clinic fees on patient ability to seek medical information elsewhere). Rust
exacerbates the two-tiered health care system under which prosperous women received full
services and information on family planning but poor women did not. One intent of Congress
in enacting Title X was to eliminate this two-tiered system. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Secretary
of HHS, 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding congressional intent expressed in Congressional
Record to eliminate two-tiered system of family planning services, and concluding the HHS
regulations contravene congressional intent).
118. See Rust v. Sullivan, II S. Ct. 1759, 1785 (1991) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (arguing
that "[b]y suppressing medically pertinent information and injecting an ideological message
unrelated to considerations of maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in
the path of Title X clients' freedom of choice.... Both the purpose and result of the
challenged Regulations is to deny women the ability voluntarily to decide their procreative
destiny. For these women, the Government will have obliterated the freedom to choose as
surely as if it had banned abortions outright.").
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Power analysis thus reveals the truly devastating impact of the Rust
decision: Rust does not strike a balance between government power and the
individual right to choose medical treatment; rather, it permits government
power to eradicate the exercise of an individual right. In the Rust clinic the
government holds effective power to manipulate patient agreement to a
particular treatment." 9 The next part compares the Rust power relationships
to three other circumstances in which the Court has looked at government
intervention in expression.
IV. COMPAISON POWER ANALYSES
A. Virginia Pharmacy
A case in which power relationships are similar to those in Rust is
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc..120 In Virginia Pharmacy, consumers challenged a state statute prohib-
iting pharmacists to advertise the price of prescription drugs,' 2' claiming
that it violated their right to receive information that pharmacists may wish
to communicate, and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.'2 The state argued that the ban on advertising was necessary to
maintain professionalism among state-licensed pharmacists'2 and to avoid
price competition that might undermine the quality of pharmacy services
and the continuity of relationships between pharmacists and customers. 2 4
The Virginia Pharmacy Court reasoned that the First Amendment protects
not only the speaker, but also the communication and the recipient,'1 and
that both the individual citizen and society as a whole have interests in the
119. See Leedes, supra note 9, at 112 (arguing that Rust decision furthered massive
government intrusion into private spheres of freedom by using censored speech to manipulate
individuals into conforming with government policy). But see Edward G. Reitler, Note, The
Title X Family Planning Subsidies: The Government's Role in Moral Issues, 27 HARv. J. ON
LEoIs. 453, 456-57 (1990) (arguing that HHS Regulation do not violate First Amendment
because they do not foster entrenchment of political party, drown out other viewpoints, or
overwhelm patient's capacity to make individual choice).
120. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
121. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 749-50 (1976).
122. Id. at 753-54.
123. Id. at 747.
124. Id. at 767-68. In addition to justifying the statute on the basis of professionalism
and quality of service, the state argued that advertising of prices was commercial speech and
therefore not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 758. The Virginia Pharmacy Court held
that even purely commercial speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction
enjoys some first amendment protection. Id. at 762.
125. Id. at 756; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
(stating that free speech rights of broadcast audience are paramount to those of broadcasters).
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free flow of commercial information. 26 The Court concluded that the ban
on advertising was a state attempt to protect citizens by keeping them in
ignorance, a paternalistic approach that the First Amendment forbids. 27
Power analysis demonstrates that the situation of the drug customer in
Virginia Pharmacy is analytically similar to the clinic patient in Rust. In
Virginia Pharmacy the first dimension power at issue was the customer's
right to dc.ide where to buy prescription drugs. Because only pharmacists
could sell prescription drugs, they held a practical monopoly on price
information; the government ban on price advertising fostered that monop-
oly by suppressing information from sources other than the customer's own
pharmacist. Both Virginia Pharmacy and Rust involve circumstances of
information monopoly. In the former, a state statute created the opportunity
for some private producers to create a limited information monopoly and
prevented competition from breaking that monopoly; in the latter, federal
regulations force service providers to use a preexisting information monopoly
to limit information. In Virginia Pharmacy, the favored choice was the
family pharmacist; in Rust, the favored choice is childbirth.
Even so, the Virginia Pharmacy customer was in a more powerful
position than the Rust patient. The Virginia Pharmacy ban applied only to
advertising, not to all speechY2 Therefore, unlike the Rust doctor, the
pharmacist was free to disclose prices to a potential customer. 29 With some
effort and little cost, customers could call or visit -pharmacies to obtain
information from a number of sources. Further, price information is easy
to understand and equally applicable to all customers. Therefore one cus-
tomer could successfully disseminate relevant information to other custom-
ers. In contrast, information about the availability, scope, and effectiveness
of alternative medical treatments is' complex to a layperson and is more
likely to be patient-specific. Treatment information appropriate for one
patient may not be appropriate for another. A clinic patient could obtain
information relevant to her own decision only from another doctor and,
therefore, only at significant economic cost."10
Furthermore, the circumstances of the Virginia Pharmacy customer and
the Rust patient differ in the apparent trustworthiness of the speaker. A
pharmacist holds special credentials in pharmacology, not in economics.
The decision of the drug customer was economic and, therefore, did not
126. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 763-64 (1976). In addition to holding that the First Amendment protects the information
interests of the individual and society, the Court noted that the Virginia statute was unnecessary
to preserve professionalism among pharmacists because the level of professionalism among
pharmacists was protected by the state's rigorous licensing requirements, id. at 768, and that
price advertising had no direct effect on professional standards. Id. at 769.
127. Id. at 770.
128. Id. at 752.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 10, 32 and accompanying text (describing doctor's medical infor-
mation monopoly and patient's economic inability to consult nonclinic doctor).
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require the pharmacist's special expertise. The customer had no reason to
believe that one pharmacist was more economically trustworthy than an-
other. In contrast, the clinic doctor did speak with apparent trustworthiness
on matters relevant to her patient's choice of medical treatment.' Compared
to Rust, the government exercised less effective third dimension power in
Virginia Pharmacy because it controlled a weaker information monopoly
with less apparent trustworthiness.
A final difference between the Virginia Pharmacy customer and the
Rust patient is the nature of their decisions. The drug customer is not
choosing a form of medical treatment; presumably she decided to accept a
treatment when she accepted a prescription from her doctor. The customer
is deciding whether to buy from one supplier or another, a decision that
carries no special constitutional protection. The Rust patient is choosing a
medical treatment, and her right to decide on abortion carries Fifth Amend-
ment protection.3 2 However, in spite of her constitutional protection, the
Rust decision subjected her to greater government power to manipulate her
choice through manipulation of information. The Virginia Pharmacy Court
dismantled government support of a partial information monopoly that
impaired individual economic decisions. The Rust Court considered a more
egregious information monopoly, more vulnerable decision maker, and more
important decision, yet allowed the government to use the monopoly to
deliver its own message and exclude competing messages.
B. Broadcast Regulation
An enduringly controversial area of government intervention in expres-
sion is the regulation of broadcasting.' The Communications Act estab-
lished an independent agency, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), 3 4 with authority to license and regulate use of broadcast airwaves
consistent with the public interest.'35 The fairness doctrine requires broad-
casters to provide broadcast time for a variety of views on public issues,3 6
131. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (describing likelihood that patient will
rely on doctor's statements as complete).
132. See supra note 30 (citing cases establishing constitutional protection for abortion
decision).
133. See generally David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press,
1975 DuKE L. J. 213 (discussing failures of broadcast regulation and suggesting alternatives);
L.A. Powe, Jr., "Or of the [Broadcast] Press," 55 TEx. L. REV. 39 (1976) (arguing that
neither empirical evidence nor legal theory support broadcast regulation). But see Susana M.
Zwerling, Reclaiming a Public Resource: The Constitutionality of Requiring Broadcasters to
Provide Free Television Advertising Time to Candidates for Federal Office, 18 Rav. oF L. &
Socut, CHANGE 213 (1990-91) (arguing that additional regulation requiring broadcasters to
provide free air time to political candidates is constitutional and in public interest).
134. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
135. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988).
136. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a). See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-32 (1973)
(holding station ban on all editorial advertising violates affirmative duty under fairness doctrine
to provide coverage of public issues); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70
(1969) (describing fairness doctrine requirements).
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to ensure equal time for targets of personal attacks, 37 and to provide
reasonable and equivalent access to political candidates.'38 The Court justifies
federal regulation of broadcast content as a means of enhancing public
debate and the First Amendment right of free speech.3 9
In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC' 4 the Court upheld an FCC decision
requiring a broadcaster to air a particular message.' 4 ' The broadcaster had
aired a program critical of an author and refused the author's request for
free air time to reply.1"' The FCC found that the broadcast was a personal
attack and ordered the station to provide reply time in accordance with the
fairness doctrine.43 The station claimed that the FCC's action and the
fairness doctrine violated its First Amendment right of free speech. 44 The
Court reasoned that because of the scarcity of available airwaves, the
137. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1920, 73.1930 (1989). See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 369-70 (describing
fairness doctrine requirements).
138. 47 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(7), 73.1940 (1988). See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 369-70 (describing
requirements for fairness doctrine); Zwerling, supra note 133, at 221-22 (summarizing content
of and justifications for fairness doctrine).
139. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)(holding constitutional statutory require-
ment of reasonable access for all federal candidates to broadcast forum as proper balance of
first amendment rights of candidates, public, and broadcasters); Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-400 (1969) (upholding fairness doctrine regulation of broadcast content
against First Amendment challenge because doctrine prevented monopoly of limited airwaves
and because First Amendment rights of listeners were paramount to those of broadcasters).
Although the avowed purpose of broadcast content regulation is to expand debate and
access to broadcast forums, in practice regulation has often achieved the opposite result. In
an ironic distortion of the purpose of broadcast regulation, the FCC delayed approval of the
tremendous increase in access offered by cable services. Powe, supra note 130, at 55. The
courts have allowed the FCC and Congress to prohibit broadcasting of controversial material,
including songs that might promote drug use, Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973), explicit discussions of sex, Illinois Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and cigarette advertising,
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), aff'g mem.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971). The ban on broadcast
of cigarette advertising was statutory. Public Health Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(1970). Congress enacted the statute after the District of Columbia Circuit Court upheld an
FCC determination that cigarette advertising represented one side of a controversial issue of
public importance. Bazhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969). The balanced programming and equal time requirements of the fairness doctrine also
discourage broadcasters from airing highly controversial issues, for fear of demands for reply
time. Finally, the process of issuing and renewing licenses exerts subtle pressures on broadcasters
to keep the content of their programming within the ideological territory of the politically
powerful. See Bazelon, supra note 133 (discussing First Amendment objections to broadcast
regulation and suggesting alternatives). Chief Judge Bazelon describes informal pressures exerted
on licensees by the FCC as "raised eyebrow" regulation, id. at 216-17, and reports specific
instances in which officials in the Nixon administration used the licensing process to suppress
critical commentary and punish political opponents. Id. at 214, 235, 244-251.
140. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
141. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
142. Id. at 371-72.
143. Id. at 372.
144. Id. at 370-71, 386.
1992] 1047
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1023
government had a responsibility to ensure airing of a variety of views. 45
Some individuals necessarily would not receive licenses,146 but their First
Amendment protection was no less than that enjoyed by the licensees.
47
Therefore, the government could, consistent with the First Amendment,
require licensees to share broadcast capability with others. 4 The funda-
mental First Amendment interest, according to the Court, was that of the
listeners to have access to a wide variety of ideas and experiences. 49 The
Court reasoned that the purpose of the First Amendment was to preserve
an unfettered marketplace of ideas, not to establish a licensee monopoly on
access to broadcasting. 50
Power analysis looks at the broadcast listener's ability to exercise a
right of autonomous decision-for example the decision on how to vote.
The broadcast listener's power landscape under Red Lion is very different
from that of the patient in a Rust clinic. First, the broadcast listener does
not face a monopoly on information relevant to her voting decision. Many
channels of relevant communication reach her, including competing broad-
casting; print media; informal social, professional, or political networks;
and common experience. These alternate channels are available at no cost
to the listener, and the relevant voting information is easy to understand
and freely exchangeable. Furthermore, the speakers enjoying government-
mandated access are no more apparently trustworthy than other speakers.
Broadcast regulation reduces agenda and manipulative power residing
in private hands by reducing monopolies on communication channels and
enforcing a standard of information neutrality similar to that which the
traditional informed consent doctrine imposes on doctors.', In contrast to
Rust, government intervention in broadcast speech does not exploit an
information monopoly to carry a government message, but rather prevents
concentrated control of a particular channel of communication and expands
the variety of information available from private speakers.5 2 The purpose
and effect of broadcast regulation is to enhance the listener's power to
make an autonomous decision. Broadcast regulation prevents formation of
private information monopolies that might threaten the autonomy of indi-
vidual decisions. In contrast, Rust allows government to use an existing
private monopoly to subvert the autonomy of an individual decision in
favor of a government-preferred choice.
145. Id. at 396-400; see supra note 139 and accompanying text (presenting scarcity of
frequencies as one justification for regulation of broadcast content).
146. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
147. Id. at 389.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 390.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (describing fairness doctrine require-
ments and rationale).
152. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (noting purpose and general effect of
broadcast regulation is to expand access to and variety of information).
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C. Mandated Access to Private Property for Speech
Another controversial example of government intervention in expression
is the requirement that under some circumstances the owner of private
property make the property available to the public for purposes of speech."1
3
Ordinarily the First Amendment forbids the government to require a private
person to express a particular message either by compelling the person to
say the message or by compelling the person to use his property to
communicate the message. 54 However, not all private property is immune
from government-imposed speech requirements. If the owner voluntarily
opens property to public use, in some circumstances the government may
require the owner to make the property available for the speech of third
parties. In Marsh v. Alabama' 5" the Court required the owners of a company
town to allow third parties to use the town's shopping district to address
the public. 56 The Court reasoned that the owner's use of the property as a
shopping center was subject to state regulation 57 and that the owner's rights
must yield to the First Amendment rights of the public.'58
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins'59 the Court upheld a state
law that required shopping center owners to allow public access for speech
purposes.160 The shopping center had ejected individuals who were soliciting
153. See generally Alan Browstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning PruneYard: Limiting
Free Speech Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property of Private Medical Clinics
Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1074 (1991) (noting that scope of
PruneYard decision remains unclear in California jurisprudence and that abortion protesters
have pressed controversial interpretation of decision).
154. See generally West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(holding that states may not require public school students to salute and pledge allegiance to
flag); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that states may not require automobiles
to bear license plates with ideological message); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1978) (invalidating state right-to-reply statute requiring newspapers to carry responses
written by targets of unfavorable articles); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
475 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating statute requiring utility to enclose literature from consumer
group in customer bills).
155. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
156. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
157. Id. at 507.
158. Id. at 509. Court decisions regarding mandated access have been inconsistent. See
generally Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)
(holding that first amendment protected informational picketing at shopping center); Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding that First Amendment did not protect distribution
of handbills at shopping center that were unrelated to shopping center activities); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling Logan Valley because discrimination based on content
of speech violated First Amendment).
159. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
160. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The issue decided by the
PruneYard Court was not the extent of First Amendment protection of the shopping center
speakers, but was rather whether a state could grant greater free speech rights to individuals
than they enjoyed under the First Amendment, without violating the speech and property
rights of the shopping center owners. Id. at 88. See cases cited supra note 158 (presenting
inconsistent decisions regarding First Amendment protection of access to private property).
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support for a political cause, and the individuals sought to enforce the state
law giving them access.16 ' The owner of the shopping center claimed that
the law violated property and speech rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 6 2
The Court disagreed, reasoning that the access requirement did not signif-
icantly impinge on the owner's property rights because the public already
had access, 63 and the owners were free to impose reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on the speakers. 64 Furthermore, according to the
Court, under these circumstances listeners were unlikely to attribute the
speech to the property owner because the property was not dedicated to his
personal use' 6 and because the owner was free to disclaim agreement with
the speech.' 66 The Court concluded that the state statute did not violate the
property or speech rights of shopping center owners. 67
The power relationships in cases of mandated access to private property
for speech are similar to those in broadcast regulation.'6 The patron of a
shopping center has the right to make an autonomous decision regarding
political choices. Like the broadcast listener, the PruneYard patron does
not face a monopoly on information relevant to a particular political
decision. The shopping center patron has access to a wide variety of
communication channels at no cost or risk, and information relevant to the
voting decision is easily understandable and transferrable. As with broad-
casting, the speakers enjoying government-mandated access appear no more
trustworthy than other speakers. Also like broadcast regulation and unlike
Rust, government intervention in expression prevents concentrated control
of a particular channel of communication and expands the variety of
information available from private speakers.
Therefore, in mandating access to private property for third-party
speech, the government does not assume second or third dimension power,
but rather disables whatever such power would otherwise reside in the
property owner. The effects are to expand the agenda of issues raised for
public debate and to increase the amount and sources of information
available to the listener. The result is an increase in the listener's real first
dimension power to decide how to vote.
Both PruneYard and Red Lion involved nonmonopoly channels of
communication that were sufficiently dominant that the Court required
161. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 77.
162. Id. at 82, 85.
163. Id. at 83.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 87.
166. Id. The PruneYard Court distinguished the shopping center access requirement from
the compelled speech cases because, first, the access requirement was content neutral and did
not involve a government-mandated message. Id. Second, the Court reasoned that, unlike the
situation in the compelled speech cases, the access requirement would not chill the owner's
speech nor impel the owner to speak when he otherwise would not. Id. at 88. But see supra
note 154 and accompanying text (describing Court decisions involving compelled speech).
167. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88.
168. See supra Part IV.B (describing power relationships in broadcast regulation).
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property rights to yield to the individual's rights of expression and need for
information. The Court moved in the opposite direction in Rust. Rust
requires a private, although partly subsidized, communication channel that
is essentially a monopoly and carries information essential to an important
individual decision, to suppress information in favor of a government
message.
V. CONCLUSION
Power analysis shows that the Rust decision sets the balance of govern-
ment power and individual rights grossly in favor of government. The
decision allows government to exercise manipulative power to undermine
the individual's right to make a decision. 169 Government intervention in two
other areas of expressioil-broadcast regulation and mandated access to
private property-has the reverse effect. In these two areas government acts
to expand both the amount of information and number of communication
channels reaching the individual, and therefore to enhance the individual's
power to exercise decisional rights.170 The case of Virginia Pharmacy pre-
sented similar power relationships to those in Rust, but with a looser
monopoly on relevant information, a less apparently trustworthy speaker,
no biased government message, and no constitutional protection for the
individual's decision.' 7' Nonetheless, the Virginia Pharmacy Court held that
the government intervention in expression impermissibly undermined the
ability of individuals to make decisions.'
72
The Rust exercise of manipulative government power is not limited to
medicine. In the area of legal services, the District of Columbia Circuit
invoked Rust in dictum to justify the prohibition on redistricting advocacy
by organizations and their staffs receiving federal legal aid subsidies. 7, In
a suit in which documentary filmmakers challenged cancellation of their
grants, the Department of Justice sent copies of the Rust decision to the
judges. 74 The Department of Justice also invoked Rust in a case involving
the discussion of homosexuality in AIDS education materials'75 and invoked
it to prohibit university researchers from discussing the results of their work
on artificial hearts. 7
6
169. See supra Part III (describing power relationships in traditional doctor-patient con-
sultation and in Rust clinic)
170. See supra Part IV.B and IV.C (describing power relationships in broadcast regulation
and in government-mandated access to private property).
171. See supra Part IV.A (describing power relationships in Virginia Pharmacy).
172. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing conclusion of Virginia Phar-
macy Court that government attempt to keep citizens in ignorance violates First Amendment).
173. Texas Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Services Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 698-99 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
174. See David A. Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Take the Money and Shut Up!.: The Government's
New Efforts to Regulate Speech, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 1992, at 55 (describing use of Rust by
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Each of these examples represents a conflict between an individual
liberty, typically speech, and the federal government's power to achieve
certain goals through spending. Moreover, these goals involve particular
ideological choices over matters that are the subject of highly charged and
unresolved political debate rather than broad consensus. So far, legal
resolution of this conflict has resorted to legal labels that obscure analysis
and dictate a particular conclusion. Power analysis avoids legal labelling. It
is one means of examining the elements of a -conflict and of understanding
the effects of a particular solution. Power analysis compellingly suggests
that, at a minimum, any significant federal exercise of third dimension
power endangers the ability of individuals to exercise rights based on
autonomous decision making.
Moira T. Roberts
